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TAX CONSEQUENCES OF
CONTRIBUTIONS TO CORPORATIONS TO
INDUCE FAVORABLE LOCATION
One of the expedients to which civic groups of a local community
may resort to induce industry to settle in its particular area is the
granting of cash, land, and/or buildings to the incoming business.
As more and more Southern communities bid for the favor of
spreading industrialism, given hope by both military and economic
arguments for dispersion of industry in the atomic era, it becomes
increasingly important to consider the tax consequences of such a
grant to the corporation the community desires to flourish in its
midst. A correspondingly growing body of federal tax law indicates
certain factors to be given consideration when making such grants.
The courts have found it difficult to determine the tax classification into which such subsidies should fall. The usual contention
of the Commissioner is that they are ordinary income, and as such
fully taxable. In turn the taxpayer argues them to be either 1) gifts,
in which case there is no income tax liability and in addition the
assets may be depreciated at the tax basis of the transferor,' or
2) "contributions to capital," in which case there may be a similar
depreciation 2 and the transferor's basis may be included in taxpayer's "equity invested capital" when computing excess profits
taxes.'
The uniform view has been that aids and grants, whether extended by the federal government,' local community groups,' or
private individuals," are not gifts where they are granted only in
return for location in the area, lower rates, or extension of services.
The nature of the case is determinative of whether they are to be
considered ordinary income or contributions to capital.
In Edwards v. Cuba Railroad,7 the Cuban government subsidized
the taxpayer railroad in return for taxpayer's building trackage
and agreeing to extend reduced rates to government personnel. The
subsidies were credited by the railroad to surplus and used directly
for capital expenditures. The court found them to be neither gifts
nor income, but rather contributions to capital, since they were
"proportionate to mileage completed, and this indicates a purpose
to reimburse plaintiff for capital expenditures." 8
In the Detroit Edison case9 taxpayer sought to justify a deduction
for depreciation computed on a basis including the payments in
controversy, claiming them to be either gifts or contributions to
capital. Taxpayer was engaged in generating and selling electric

energy in Detroit and vicinity. Upon receipt of applications for the
extension of its already existing lines to places it considered too far
from those lines to warrant the expenditures involved, it required
the applicant to pay a sum representing the cost per mile of constructing the lines, with a stipulation for refunds over a given
period of time. The court held that while all expenditures having
a reasonable relationship to the asset are part of its cost, so must
all receipts having a similar relationship be deducted from that cost,
and that the contributions by prospective users of the facilities
were of the latter nature. Thus those contributions were excluded
from the cost basis of the asset. The court also found the contributions to be neither gifts nor contributions to capital because "it
overtaxes the imagination to regard the farmers and other customers who furnished these funds as makers either of donations or
contributions to the company.,'
According to one writer, Detroit
Edison suggests that a payment will not be considered a contribution to capital if exacted from a prospective customer as a
prerequisite to doing business with him." The court did not have
before it the question of whether the contributions were in the
nature of ordinary income, a circumstance which seems likely.
A leading case in which subsidies were treated as income is
Baboquivari Cattle Co. v. Comm. 2 There the taxpayer qualified
for payments under the federal Soil Conservation Act by making
capital improvements to land he had leased from the government.
The payments, which amounted to less than taxpayer's expenditures, were computed with reference to acreage of the land involved
and number of cattle grazed thereon. The court, finding that taxpayer was free to use the money for any purpose he desired, whether
to defray operating expenses or pay dividends, concluded the payments were within the broad definition of income under § 22(a) of
the Code. The inference to be drawn from the case is that the
court considered the capital outlays as only conditions precedent to
qualification for subsidies designed to supplement taxpayer's ordinary income.
Where such subsidies are designed primarily to supplement
ordinary income, they are uniformly held taxable as income themselves, as for example, where each year a ferry company was
subsidized $1000 per mile of its 23-mile run,"3 where a government
subsidy was designed to provide a minimum of "guaranteed operating income,"' and where taxpayer, having agreed to deposit
$250,000 in a special fund set aside for capital expenditures, was
granted a contract with the Postmaster General giving him the right
to carry the mails at rates substantially higher than usual.'

One of the latest and most important decisions in the field is
Brown Shoe Co. *v. Comm.,16 a proceeding for redetermination of
taxpayer's excess profits tax. The issue arose from the payment
of cash and the transfer of buildings to the taxpayer by certain
community groups as an inducement to the location or expansion
of taxpayer's factory operations in the communities concerned.
Taxpayer had received in 17 transactions some $885,559 in cash
and $85,471 in buildings from various groups in 12 towns, a
majority of the transfers being pursuant to written contracts
between the parties. These contracts were of three types, requiring
taxpayer to either 1) locate, equip, or enlarge a factory in the
community and run it for ten years if practical, 2) enlarge an
existing factory and run it for ten years with increased personnel,
or 3) construct an addition to taxpayer's existing factory. The sums
received by taxpayer pursuant to the contracts were placed in a
general bank account from which general operating expenses,
including costs of expansion, were paid. Taxpayer contended the
contributions were contributions to capital within the meaning of
that phrase in both the income and excess profits tax statutes.
Therefore, said taxpayer, the basis for depreciation of the acquired
buildings need not be reduced by the value of the contributions as
was done in Detroit Edison, nor need those sums be excluded from
"equity invested capital" in computing excess profits taxes. With
this contention the Supreme Court agreed. Relying on another
recent case," the court asserted, contrary to the decision of the
Tax Court, that contributions to capital need not originate with
persons having a proprietary interest in the corporation. It found
no difficulty in distinguishing Detroit Edison, noting that in the
latter case consideration had run from the taxpayer to the individual contributor in the- form of special services for which the
contributor was paying, while in Brown Shoe the consideration ran to
the benefit of the community at large. The court felt there should
be no distinction in treatment afforded actually contributed buildings and cash donated to the company which may or may not have
been traceable into buildings later purchased, although the Tax
Court had seen such a distinction."8
In the light of the Brown Shoe decision, and the McKay Products
case upon which it depends,"9 it would seem that, in spite of the
inference in Detroit Edison, a donation may qualify as a contribution to capital although the contributor is a non-shareholder. It
would appear, too, in spite of strong language in the Baboquivari
decision, that it is not fatal that such contributions cannot be traced
directly into capital expenditures of the corporation. Yet these
factors are important when the nature of the transaction hints at
a grant designed to supplement income, or one coerced from the
individual by the favorable position of the corporation.

It is evident that the courts have sought to give subsidy situations
the most beneficial treatment to the taxpayer where the result of
the contributions is to serve the community rather than certain
individuals. Thus the favorable decision of the Cuba Railroad case
will be followed in a Brown Shoe situation and the unfavorable
results of the Detroit Edison case avoided where it is made apparent
that the willing desire of the community and not the considered
exploitation of the individual is the dominant factor inducing the
contribution.
RITA BRANDT
FOOTNOTES
1. INT. REV. CODE § 113(a) (2).
2. INT. REV. CODE §113(a) () (B).
3. INT. REV. CODE § 437(c).
4. Baboquivari Cattle Co. v. Comm., 135 F. 2d 114 (C. C. A. 9th, 1943).
5. Brown Shoe Co. v. Comm., 339 U. S. 583 (1950) ; Comm. v. McKay
Products Corp., 178 F. 2d 639 (1949).
6. Detroit Edison Co. v. Comm., 319 U. S. 98 (1943).7. 268 U. S. 628 (1925).
8. Id. at 632.
9. 319 U. S. 98 (1943).
10. Id. at 102.
11. See O'Meara, Contributions to Capital by Non-Shareholders, 3 TAX
LAW REVIEW 568 (1948).

12. 135 F. 2d 114 (C. C.A. 9th, 1943).
13. Helvering v. Clairborne-Annapolis Ferry Co., 93 F. 2d 875 (C. C. A. 4th,
1938).
14. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. U. S., 286 U. S. 285, 76 L. Ed. 1108 (1932).
15. Lykes Bros. Steamship Co., Inc. v. Comm., 42 B. T. A. 1395 (1940).
16. 339 U. S. 583 (1950).
17. Comm. v. McKay Products Corp., 178 F. 2d 639 (1949).
18. 10 T.C.35 (1948).
19. See note 17, supra.

